Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

Following the 18 Tir 1378 events (18^th day of the Iranian month of Tir, solar Hejri year 1378, or July 9, 1999; the incidents have come to be known as “The 18 Tir Events”), the National Security High Council convened numerous meetings for the purpose of examining and investigating the matter, subsequent to which it issued a report. On the anniversary of and in revisiting those events, the full text of said report is reprinted as follows. The text was obtained from the National Security High Council’s website.

Asr-e Iran – Today is 18 Tir, 1398 (July 9, 2019) and twenty years have passed since the bitter and painful events of 18 Tir, 1378. Following the 18 Tir, 1378 events, the National Security High Council convened numerous meetings for the purpose of examining and investigating the matter, subsequent to which it issued a report. On the anniversary of and in revisiting those events, the full text of said report, drawn from the National Security High Council’s website, is as follows:

The painful events of the Kuy-e Daneshgah (“Tehran University Dormitory Complex”), which saddened the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, the Honorable President, and the noble people of Iran, and the events that followed and laid the groundwork for the presence of certain sell-out, unpatriotic, and opportunistic individuals, were among events which, made our people aware, once again, of the existence of domestic and foreign enemies lying in wait to act against the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Regime. This time, as in the past, our ever-present people’s political maturity and unparalleled vigilance and awareness, created the 23 Tir (July 14, 1999) epic saga, and turned the misplaced hopes of the ignorant, the mercenaries, and the enemies of Islam into despair.

As the noble people of Iran know, after the saddening and painful events of Kuy-e Daneshgah, the events subsequent thereto ended, and when the ensuing atmosphere of anxiety and apprehension was over and complete calm had returned to Tehran, given the importance of the matter and the noble people’s demands – especially the dear students, as well as the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution and the Honorable President’s emphasis on the serious and detailed follow up of the Kuy-e Daneshgah – the National Security High Council decided that a Special Committee would be stablished in order to investigate and look into the matter and examine and analyze the different aspects of the aforementioned event, and declare its findings. On that basis, and in order to shed light on the “various dimensions of the problem”; “the people who played a significant role in the event”; “the conduct and behavior of students, political and administrative organs, police personnel, unofficial groups”; as well as other contributing factors, the National Security High Council approved the formation of the Investigative Committee composed of the following individuals:

Committee Members:

[It was decided that] the Committee be based at the National Security High Council’s Secretariat under the charge of Ali Rabi’ee, member of the Secretariat.

The Committee, approved by the Supreme Leader and the Honorable President, started its work on July 18, 1999, and thoroughly investigated and examied the entirety of the incidents and factors and individuals that played a role in the Kuy-e Daneshgah events, in the time frame consisting of 9:30 PM on the night of July 8, 1999, until 10 o’clock in the morning of Friday, July 9, 1999. The Ministry of Information was in charge of investigating the incidents that occurred from Friday onward.

* In its first session, the Committee approved the following subjects as the main issues for investigation and analysis:

a) How the students’ initial gathering and march occurred.

b) The role of political groups, whether known student groups or anti-revolutionary grouplets (derogatory term used by the Islamic Republic for opposition groups).

c) Presence, behavior, and conduct of police personnel in the various stages of the events.

d) Decision-making hierarchy, as well as the Islamic Republic Police Force’s decision-making regarding the events.

e) The role of unofficial groups and their influence on how the events unfolded.

f) Other significant factors and their influence on the events.

* In order to expedite the process and reach conclusions in the shortest possible time, the Committee formed investigative groups (secondary) composed of representatives from various organs, including, the Armed Forces Judicial Organization, one person; the State General Inspection Organization, 2 persons; the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, one person; the Ministry of Interior’s Security General Administration, 2 persons; the Nation Security High Council Secretariat, 3 persons (that it has invited in its session).

Four Methods for Following Up on the Matter

* Each of these working groups researched various subjects regarding the aforementioned issues, and communicated their findings to the Secretariat. In order to address the matter in a specialized and expert manner, the committee began and brought to an end its investigations using four methods:

1. Conducting Field investigations
2. Examination and study of documents and evidence
3. Conducting In-person interviews
4. Arresting and detaining certain suspects and conducting interrogations

* Members of the Committee and its working groups, went to the Kuy (“Dormitory Complex”) intermittently and without prior notice, and interviewed the students living in the University Dormitory Complex, and recorded their statements. Furthermore, Committee representatives interviewed the Islamic Republic Police Force personnel from the relevant department [within the Police Force that were on the ground at the time of the events]. To that end, the Secretariat asked the relevant departments to forward the entirety of their reports and documents (whether written or on video) to the Committee. The Ministries of Information, Interior, Culture and Higher education, as well as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the [State] Radio and Television Organization, Tehran Province Governor’s Office, the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education’s Herassat (“Protection” and security) Department, the Islamic Republic News Agency, the students (independently), and the Islamic Republic Police Force, were among institutions that submitted reports.

Interviewing Suspects

* The report is the product of dozens of hours of the main Investigation Committee meetings, 25 sessions of the working groups, including interviewing students, witnesses, suspects, relevant authorities; summoning 60 individuals and interviewing suspects and persons present at the scene; arrest and detention of individuals and groups connected to the events by the Ministry of Information; and examining more than 1000 pages of official documents and transcribed tapes of negotiations, interviews, meetings, etc., in the course of 22 days, working constantly and around the clock.

* The conclusions reached by the Committee were ultimately discussed and examined closely in the course of 5 meetings with the Committee Representatives in attendance, and the conclusions are therefore agreed to by the members of the [Committee].

* The time frame in which the Committee was to conduct its work did not realistically correspond to the actual time needed to investigate certain root causes of the events (even though the Committee was able to obtain considerable and well-documented data in all cases); furthermore, there was a need to shed light on all the unknown aspects and elements of said events. For those reasons, and for purposes of the latter, the Committee decided to entrust the Ministry of Information with the task of investigating issues such as “how the students’ initial gathering and march occurred”, “how unofficial aggressor elements were present at the University”, etc., for a final finding.

Now that the Investigating Committee’s work has ended after extensive and round the clock efforts by the relevant organs and individuals, their conclusions are hereby presented to the honorable people of Iran.

We hope that we have accomplished our task to the satisfaction of God and the honorable people of Iran.

It is necessary to point out several issues:

1. The Kuy-e Daneshgah event is completely different than the events of the days that followed. The Supreme Leader and the President emphasized this point from the start, and Islamic Republic officials held the belief that the main incident should not be forgotten or disregarded in spite of subsequent events. The Committee began and brought to fruition its work with the full-fledged support of the country’s officials, taking into consideration the vital significance of the country’s cultural issues, and in particular, the issues of the young and vibrant generation of students, and paying particular attention to the concerns of the Regime’s high-ranking officials and the sensitivities of the government and of the President himself.

It must be noted that, in a separate letter to the Committee, the Supreme Leader, stressing the point that the actual incident of the Kuy-e Daneshgah itself, must not be forgotten under any circumstances whatsoever, provided the Committee with his support and guidance.

2. This report does not contain the names of any individuals since certain arrestees are currently in detention and their conviction has not become final. The names have also not been mentioned for the purpose of protecting and respecting the rights, the right to privacy, and the social rights of the individuals and suspects connected to the events. In certain cases only, the title and the positions of certain individuals have been mentioned. It goes without saying that the exact names of those individuals has been provided to the Judiciary Branch, and the Judiciary Branch will inform the public of the results [of its actions] once all the legal steps have been taken.

In addition to the aforementioned work, and in order to ensure [accuracy] and further specificity, the Committee members went to Kuy-e Daneshgah on three separate occasions without prior notice, and interviewed the students and closely discussed and examined their issues.

Furthermore, every individual personnel of the Police Force involved in the incident was interviewed as well. The Committee made every effort in the utmost impartiality to discover the truth and determine the facts and report the same on the basis of fairness and justice. Therefore, although the expectation was for the report to be prepared and the conclusions thereof be communicated to the public much earlier, however, given the aforementioned reasons and given new reports submitted to the Committee, the presentation of this report took longer than expected.

And now, the narrative and the description of the events is respectfully submitted briefly in several sections.

 

Part One: The Backdrop for the Events

1. Background

According to an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps report, there were 104 cases of assembly, protest marches, and clashes between May 25, 1997 and January 12, 1999, two of which occurred outside the Kuy (Dormitory Complex). Additionally, reports available at the Police Force, the Ministry of the Interior, The ministry of Information, and the University’s Herassat Department, indicate that there have been assemblies and demonstrations at Kuy-e Daneshgah (prior to the recent events), as a general matter.

The Secretariat’s conclusions indicate that there have been 14 demonstrations at the Kuy-e Daneshgah (“Tehran University Dormitory Complex”) – given available documents – from [early] 1997 until [early] 1998, two of which were spilled outside the Kuy.

These cases have predominantly started with a group of 10 to 15 people, from in front of Building 22 between the hours of 10 and 11 PM, and upon exiting the guarded entrance and into North Kargar Street, walked toward Jalal Alahmad Highway.

The number of people participating in these demonstrations has been recorded at 100 to 150 on average. The Yussefabad Police Precinct mostly thwarted these actions, stopping the demonstrations, and redirecting the demonstrators toward the Kuy, using appropriate methods. The slogans chanted at these marches were also mostly in connection with the subject at hand.

 

1. Formation of the Recent Events’ Assembly and March

Upon examination of the entirety of the reports (regarding the formation) and hearing the interviewees’ oral reports, and after gathering various viewpoints, the Committee’s assessment regarding the manner in which the July 8, 1999, assembly and march took shape is as follows:

Following the passage of the Bill Amending the Law of the Press in the Majless (Parliament) and, at the same time, the ban on [the publication of] Salaam newspaper on the orders of the Special Prosecutor’s Office for the Clergy, a notice was put up on the announcement board at around 9:30 PM in the evening of July 8, 1999, to call for a gathering. (The individual who had written and put up the handwritten announcement had invited the students to assemble.) The author of the announcement then proceeded to go to the students’ rooms, asking them to attend the assembly and demonstrations. From around 10 PM, the primary core of about 15 students and the writer of the announcement, motivated and encouraged other students to march. Given the Kuy-e Daneshgah Building 22’s special characteristic (housing over 600 students and having the highest concentration of students), [the march] started from that Building and the students chanted slogans asking other student residents to join them. Some residents refused, and some joined. The students then proceeded to pass in front of buildings 18, 19, and 21, encouraging the residents to join them. Consequently, as they got closer to the Kuy main entrance at around 10:30 PM, a crowd of about 150 individuals chanted the slogan “Guard, Open the gate” and exited the main entrance. The first phase of the incident thus took shape.

Important Summary Points:

1. According to the Police report, about 70 people were at the Kuy as guests on the night of the incident (July 8, 1999). The Committee’s investigations indicate, however, that usually and as a matter of course, 10 percent of the residents are guests on any given night.

One of the Kuy’s guard registries has recorded 17 guests on the night in question, and assuming that the same numbers of guests were registered in the other registry that has since been missing, one can calculate the approximate number of guests based thereupon. Additionally, the Committee has not received any reports that indicate that the presence of said guests had been coordinated and organized beforehand.

2. According to the Ministry of Information’s report that was submitted to the Committee in two stages, the Tahkim-e Vahdat Office (literally meaning “Strengthening Unity”; a student organization) had not made any decisions to assemble and march at its Thursday meeting, and the Committee was not able to reach any conclusions as to whether any particular planning and organizing activity was going on among the students or not. Follow-up investigations were entrusted to the Ministry of Information, given the [information regarding] the defendants and other resources that are at the disposal of relevant organs [and said Ministry].

3. The Ministry of Culture and Higher Education representatives, as well as individuals summoned from student organizations, have strongly denied any organizational decision-making in this regard. The investigations conducted have not proven to the Committee that the official presence of well-known student organizations was done based on a prior decision. Given certain reports submitted to the Committee regarding the presence of suspect and adventure-seeking elements on both sides on the night in question, and given that rendering a clear, transparent, and reassuring opinion about these elements required more time and further investigation, the Committee decided to entrust the Ministry of Information with the task of further investigations regarding the adventure-seeking elements on the night in question at the Kuy-e Daneshgah, so that it can announce its findings to the public upon taking necessary and thorough action, and reaching clear and definitive conclusions. The Committee also hereby reports that the individual who had written and put up the announcement for the gathering has been arrested by the Ministry of Information, and investigations are continuing in order to further clarify the issues regarding the manner in which the gathering took shape – that continue to remain unclear – and the reasons therefor. The Committee also entrusted the Ministry of Information with the mission of continuing its interrogation of individuals arrested as well as other individuals, with regards to the presence of suspect elements affiliated with anti-revolutionary currents and movements, and announce its new conclusions, if any are reached.

4. In spite of the fact that there is much precedence for these types of demonstrations, they are, in essence, illegal. The officials’ [negligence in] not preventing these kinds of actions in the past has turned them (the demonstrations and marches) into an normal and ordinary thing. It seems that in order to prevent the negative repercussions of such incidents, all illegal demonstrations across the country by any group [or organization] must be stopped.

5. The Committee believes that illegal entities that conduct activities in the name of student organizations outside the university, and at times, within the university structure, must be dealt with decisively and in a principled manner, and these types of actions must be severely prevented from occurring.

These entities’ actions have certainly had an effect in creating the restless atmosphere in student environments.

6. It is the committee’s belief that the regulations regarding political activity in universities is in need of re-examination and analysis, and in need of drafting appropriate and comprehensive rules in order for students to carry out lawful social and political activities, taking into account political, cultural, and social conditions.

7. The Committee believes that it was the psychological pressure stemming from political tensions between various factions; the issues brought up in the media; the closure of Salaam newspaper; the Amendment of the Law on the Press; and the animosity and conflict existing between various factions; that created the bedrock and laid the groundwork for the occurrence of this event.

8. The Committee believes that there was failure and deficiency on the part of the relevant security, political, and cultural entities to anticipate and foresee the occurrence of these events.

 

Part Two: Various Operational and Practical Stages of the Occurrence of the Incident

Given the above, we will now describe the various operational and practical stages of the occurrence of said incident:

Stage One: From 10:45 PM on the night of Thursday, July 8, 1999, to 12:45 AM of July 9, 1999.

Having examined the entirety of the reports submitted, and in view of the discussions in the Committee itself, [we have determined that] the manner in which the first stage started and ended is as follows:

At 10:45 PM, around 50 of the Kuy-e Daneshgah students engaged in an illegal demonstration march. The Students marched from the location of the Kuy-e Daneshgah to Jalal Alahmad Highway, as [they had done] in the past. Some students participated in the demonstrations wearing comfortable clothing (slippers, sweatshirt).

The students’ demonstrations continued until they arrived at the Faculty of Technology entrance, and they then proceeded to return to the Dormitory Complex’s main gate. At around 10:45 PM, two police vehicles from the Yussefabad Police Precinct (one Nissan Patrol [SUV] and one Mercedes Benz 230 [sedan]) arrived at the location. Given their past experience with regards to these types of situations, the officers treated the students in a cordial manner and asked them to return to their dormitories, to which the students responded positively, chanting “Police Force, thank you, thank you”, and the situation came to a close.

After the demonstrations had ended and the students had returned to the Kuy main entrance, a number of students gathered there and engaged in discussions, and refused to go inside the Dormitory Complex. The first stage of the Kuy-e Daneshgah events ended there and the Yussefabad Police Precinct patrol returned to their base.

[Photo caption: Takzadeh, then-Deputy Minister of the Interior for Political Affairs, giving a speech before a gathering of students at the Kuy-e Daneshgah]

Important Points and the Summary of Stage One:

1. It appears that these demonstrations were not any different in their early stages than previous ones. The number and manner of the students’ presence, what they were wearing, etc., was not any different.

2. The Committee was not able to reach a conclusion regarding the demonstrations having been carried out based on prior and special planning and organizing; the continuation of the investigations was referred to the Ministry of Information.

3. The Committee ruled that the Ministry of Information was to conduct additional investigations regarding the identity of the aforementioned persons (the core people) and their reasons for remaining in front of the main entrance after the demonstrations had ended, and to submit its findings to the Committee.

4. The Committee believes that the Yussefabad Police Precinct authorities’ conduct at this stage was reasonable and expedient, in such a way that not only the students agreed to end the march but they also chanted the slogan “Police Force, thank you, thank you”. For that reason, the Committee requests commendations for the relevant officers.

Stage Two: From 12:45 AM to 2:45 AM of July 9, 1999

At around 30 minutes past midnight, [12:30 AM] of Friday [July 9], the students’ demonstrations came to a close and they returned back inside the Dormitory Complex, with the exception of about 15 students who had gathered in front of the Kuy main entrance, engaged in talks and discussions, and had no desire to return inside the Complex.

At this time, the Deputy [Commander] of the Greater Tehran Central [Police] District who had been brought up to date on the situation through the relevant unit, arrived at the scene dressed in plainclothes at around 12:45 AM.

Before arriving at the location and assessing the situation, he had asked for reinforcements from various police precincts. No sooner had he arrived on the scene in plainclothes that a number of police units also got there.

He engaged the students in a conversation upon his arrival, without any results. At the same time, the director general of the Dormitory Complex who had been informed of the Deputy Commander’ arrival by Herassat arrived at the Kuy and started discussing the matter with him. He asked the Commander for 5 minutes in order to calm the students down, and asked the newly arrived police forces to leave the scene. Ultimately, the negotiations bore no fruit and resulted in a dispute between the Commander and the Dormitory’s director general.

The investigations indicated that a scuffle ensued between the students and the police, where the students started throwing the objects at their disposal in order to repel the police. At this time, one of the soldiers hit his foot against the street curb and fell down. He was then apprehended by the students and attacked by some among them. He was taken to the booth at the main entrance, and was released a few minutes later.

From that point on, the clashes began to have a different tenure and the students’ position and slogans became more extreme.

The clashes continued, and once again the police force attacked the students and pushed them back. The number of students at this point increased to 500 to 600, and the police also added to its own capacity and capabilities.

The atmosphere at this point became completely emotional. Students began throwing stones, and on the opposite side, plainclothes individuals accompanying the police started doing the same.

As a result of the students throwing stones, the clock in front of the Dormitory Complex entrance and the childcare center across from the dorm were broken. Two of the students were arrested by the police at this point.

Subsequently, a member of the Tehran University’s Islamic Student Association prepared a resolution [inviting] the students to remain inside the Kuy, with no results.

Upon learning of the incident from the Dormitory Complex director, Tehran University Vice President for Student Affairs came to the scene and began giving a speech, going on with the speech in spite of attempts by some of the students to prevent him, without any palpable results.

The Tehran Province Governor’s Director for Political Affairs Comes to the Scene

The Tehran Province Governor’s Director General for Political Affairs was informed of the incident by the Tehran Province Governor’s Deputy for Political Affairs, and arrived at the scene at 2:15 AM. He stated: “The street was very crowded, full of stones and unusual objects. The atmosphere was extremely tense and stone throwing was rampant, especially by the students. I asked for permission and introduced myself as the representative for Tajzadeh (then-Deputy Minister of the Interior) and the Ministry of Interior.”

This person tried to re-direct the students inside the Mosque and the Kuy, with the assistance of the Dormitory Complex Director. According to the results of the investigations, his speech was effective even though a number of students were opposed to him delivering one. Toward the end of his speech, the sound of shooting heard from the south of North Kargar Street made the atmosphere tense once again and made the actions taken up to that point ineffectual.

At this time, the [back and forth] and stop and go clashes between the students and the Police Force raised the tension, whereupon the students lit a fire in the middle of the street. The students used mainly garbage bags and objects on the side of the street to start the fire.

Important Points and Summary of Stage Two:

1. After the arrival of the Deputy [Commander] of the Greater Tehran Central [Police] District on the scene and his unwise conduct, the clashes increased exponentially. It appears that a certain number of people who did not wish to see an end to the situation, took advantage of the circumstances to intensify [and worsen] it.

2. The Police Force’s inappropriate actions on the one hand, and the students’ anger and insults hurled at the police, the response by plainclothes forces, and the temporary detention of one of the soldiers by the students, on the other hand, added to the parties’ anger and tension, especially the police’s, and laid the groundwork for making rash and unwise decisions.

3. It is the belief of the Committee members that the manner in which officials make statements, especially the relevant officials in these types of unrest, especially in those special conditions, must be measured and precise, and not in such a way as to incite people’s negative feelings.

4. The results of the investigations indicate that, given the signs of anger in his behavior, the Deputy [Commander] of the Greater Tehran Central [Police] District lacked the requisite prudence and wisdom in resolving the situation, and that his tactlessness and lack of wisdom was what laid the groundwork for the unrest. It further appears that arbitrary behavior and not following existing guidelines for such situations, was among the causes of the Kuy events.

5. The presence of certain private individuals as pressure groups such as (…) at that juncture is clear and undisputed, and their presence was instrumental in intensifying the clashes.

(The necessary explanations regarding these forces and how they were present at the scene will be provided in the relevant section.)

Stage Three: From 2:45 AM to 9 AM of July 9, 1999

At this stage, the clashes between the student and the Police Force continued, with a brief break, as follows:

Stone throwing by the students and the reciprocal response by plainclothes forces alongside the Police continued. At this time, the Deputy [Commander] of the Tehran Police District arrived at the scene.

Investigations indicate that there were two groups of plainclothes forces, composed of those who were police personnel and servicemen [that is, soldiers performing their mandatory military service], and the other group belonged to known [militia] groups and other individuals.

At this point, the Tehran Province Governor’s Deputy for Political Affairs arrived at the scene and engaged in talks with Deputy [Commander] of the Greater Tehran Police District, the complete version and conclusions of which are in the report attached hereto. The talks between political officials and the Police Force [personnel] bore no fruit and no agreement was reached.

Beginning at 3:25 AM, the number of students gradually increased in a significant way and stone throwing continued on their part. At this time, an object set on fire (it was not a Molotov cocktail) was thrown on the roof of the bus station on Kargar Street.

The police force mounted an attack close to the entrance to the Complex and then retreated. Expletives and insults from students were reported, with plainclothes forces and some of the soldiers responding as well.

Both sides’ state of mind was reported to be extremely tense. At this time, the number of plainclothes forces started to increase.

Several police commanders stated that the plainclothes forces encouraged the police to attack, and scolded them using curse words such as … for not attacking and failing to forcefully deal with the students. The latter commander believed that the Police Force was thus under psychological pressure from both sides (students and plainclothes forces).

Setting a Deadline

A Greater Tehran Police District official drove in a car toward the students gathered in front of the entrance to the Dormitory Complex and started speaking to them using a loudspeaker: “Dear students! We do not intend to clash with you but we are asking that you leave the scene very quickly and return to the Kuy. And we are duty-bound to deal with you forcefully if you continue to stay on the premises, and we are giving you a deadline.”

After the deadline came to pass, the Deputy [Commander] of the Greater Tehran Police District ordered the forces to advance. At this stage, the use of tear gas, the burning of fire, and the chanting of slogans against the Police Force was perfectly visible.

Under these conditions, and because of the students’ resistance, clashes between the police and the students went on for a few minutes in front of the entrance.

According to reports, the Police Force, the names of whose commanders have been ascertained, entered the Kuy looking for a purge. At this stage, the throwing of stones at the police from inside the dormitory and by the plainclothes forces toward the Kuy-e Daneshgah intensified.

The totality of the reports submitted and the statements made to the Investigative Committee indicate that between 25 and 30 plainclothes individuals not affiliated with the Police Force took advantage of the opportunity and entered the Kuy. The Deputy [Commander] of the Greater Tehran Police District stated that these individuals entered through the Faculty of Technology gate.

At this stage, three servicemen of the Shahid Dastgheib Company’s Nateb Special Unit stated, “as we were coming down the stairs from the third floor, we noticed that the forces had left the premises and that a large number of students were present in the stairwell”.

They turned around and went back to the roof and from there, they let the police forces know that they were present at that location. Seeing these soldiers, several students took them hostage. The soldiers stated that a number of angry students attacked them and intended to beat them, and proceeded to violently take them to the lower levels.

At this time, between 10 and 15 students began to guard the soldiers. These soldiers were taken to the basement of Building 14 which was part of the Kuy’s dormitory warehouse.

Entrance of an Individual Affiliated with Known Groups

At this point Mr. Mussavi Lari (then-Minister of the Interior) was informed by the Governor’s Deputy for Political Affairs that the individual had entered the Kuy. Negotiations between political and law enforcement officials were ongoing during this time.

For instance, the Honorable Minister of the Interior provided some guidance to the Deputy [Commander] of the Police Force and the latter notified the commander present on the scene of these directives. The entry of unofficial plainclothes forces and the beating of the students by these individuals tremendously added to the students’ state of excitation and anger.

The presence of Mr. (…), a well-known individual affiliated with unofficial known groups, in the Complex was an instigating factor for the students, given that they knew him well.

Important Points and Summary of Stage Three:

1. The Committee’s findings indicates that, in spite of certain assertions to the effect that the Police Force entered the Kuy with a prior decision [and intent] to engage in clashes and to create tension in society by entering the University [grounds], such an assessment is incorrect and that there were no prior decisions made at the commanding levels of the Police Force to engage in clashes. The manner of their presence and decision-making to take action does not confirm prior planning and decision-making to that effect

2. What is clear is that, after coming to the scene, the Governor’s Deputy for Political Affairs told the police to leave the premises and take up positions in a place where they could not be seen. From the Ministry of the Interior’s and the Governor’s Office’s perspective, this was an order that was binding; the Police Force did not deem it sufficient, however. Since examination of these instances was open to interpretation and potentially contentious, the Committee refrained from addressing it and stressed the necessity of [defining and] clarifying the duties and responsibilities [of various authorities] in these instances.

Furthermore, a glance at the manner in which the events were reported indicates weakness and insufficiency in the Police force’s reporting system.

[Photo Caption: The rooms at the Kuy-e Daneshgah (“University Dormitory Complex”) were attacked [and ransacked]]

3. The Committee’s findings regarding the level of damage indicates that the numbers provided do not correspond with the reality [on the ground], and that the actual damage is less than what has been announced. In this incident, 10 dormitory buildings, 13 guard posts, and a one cafeteria were damaged as follows:

1. Major and minor damage to 290 doors to the rooms and to 92 closet doors;
2. 690 windows in various sizes were broken;
3. 5 refrigerators were broken;
4. 6 appliances and audio visual equipment were broken, such as computer, television sets, …
5. And other minor damage to other Kuy facilities.

The damage was done by the following groups:

• Greater Tehran Police District forces;
• Plainclothes police forces;
• Unofficial plainclothes forces present at the scene;
• Groups of individuals from among students (in order to light fires to neutralize the effect of the tear gas, create barriers, and fight the forces).

4. The Committee believes that the totality of the political, cultural, security, and police organs did not possess the necessary skill and efficiency to anticipate and foresee these events, and that the relevant [governmental] entities should be notified [and warned of such shortcomings].

5. The committee’s findings indicate that unofficial plainclothes forces gradually came on the scene from 2 AM onward through coordinated effort and communication. Among them, certain known individuals, such as Messrs. (…) were observed.

It appears that the Police should have acted more decisively in preventing these individuals from interfering in the whole incident, especially their entry into the Kuy.

6. It is the Committee’s belief that the beatings and the destruction was not done solely by the Police Force, and that unofficial plainclothes forces were also involved in the beating of students.

7. The Committee has conducted extensive investigations regarding the decision-making hierarchy and the person who ultimately issued the order to enter the Kuy. These investigations indicate that the Commander of the Islamic Republic Police Force, General Hedayatollah Lotfian had not issued an order to enter the Kuy. Furthermore, after the first entry, the Deputy Police Commander notified [those concerned] on behalf of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief (the Minister of the Interior) of the decision to refrain from entering the dormitory.

[Photo caption: Front Page of Bahar newspaper one year after the events of 18 Tir, and the announcement of the verdict for the defendants in the case]

The Consequences of the Police Force’s Actions: Conviction of the Commanders

8. After much discussion and analysis, the Committee’s findings regarding the actions of the Police Force are as follows:

a)      Actions of the Police Force: The Force’s actions were expedient from 10 PM on the evening of July 8, 1999, until the arrival of the Deputy Commander of the Greater Tehran Police District.

From 12:45 AM until 4:15 AM, the Police Force had not taken any unlawful actions; however, lack of wisdom has been established in the aforementioned Deputy Commander’s actions. Clearing out the street and preventing the spread of the unrest were among the Police’s inherent duties at this stage.

Specifically, from 4:15 AM, the Police Force entered the dormitory and, in the hours that followed, operated on the scene without heeding the orders of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief (the Minister of the Interior) not to enter, etc.

b)      The totality of the Deputy Commander of the Greater Tehran Police District’s conduct indicates that he did not possess the necessary skill and competence to command a city such as Tehran.

c)      In spite of the fact that the Committee believes the atmosphere prior to the Police Force entering the Kuy was tense and one where the forces were tired and angry because of the insults that had been exchanged, protracted clashes, etc., and that insults by certain individuals inside the Kuy, as well as pressure from unofficial plainclothes forces and psychological pressure had created unfavorable conditions for the Police to take measured and expedient decisions, the forces’ entry into the dormitories, destruction [of property], and the beating of the students was unlawful, however, and those who made and executed the decisions are at fault.

On that basis, after conducting the necessary examinations and analysis, the Committee has identified the persons at fault jointly and in coordination with the Islamic Republic Police Force Inspection [Department], and refers the following individuals to the competent judicial authorities:

1. Deputy Commander of the Greater Tehran Police District
2. Commander of Greater Tehran Police District Special Unit
3. Commander of NOPO (Not known exactly what the acronym stands for; the general consensus, loosely confirmed by police officials, is that it stands for Anti-Terror Special Forces) and the Special Unit Plainclothes Police
4. Deputy Commander of NOPO
5. Two Anti-Riot Special Unit company commanders
6. Deputy Commander of the Central Police District (solely for lack of expediency and proper decision-making; did not participate in the beatings)
7. NOPO personnel and other individuals who were identified by the Islamic Republic Police Force Inspection [Department].

Part Three: Analysis of the Causes for and the Circumstances of the Presence of Plainclothes Forces

One of the Committee’s assigned tasks and objectives is the examination of the causes for and the manner of the plainclothes individuals’ (unaffiliated with Police Force) presence, the level of their involvement in the clashes, and their identities.

To that end, the Committee formed a special working group with the Ministry of Information and the Police Force’s Information Department. Some of the known plainclothes individuals were summoned and interrogated by the Committee, and others were referred to the Ministry of Information due to their unresponsiveness and contradictory and ambiguous statements, and were put in temporary detention.

The Committee’s objective was to have these individuals released as soon as the necessary investigations had been conducted.

Important Points and Summary

1. Upon examination and analysis of the reports as well as the investigations, it is clear beyond a doubt for the Committee that there were plainclothes individuals unaffiliated with police forces present at Kuy-e Daneshgah and involved in the clashes.

 

2. These individuals started to arrive on the scene at 2 o’clock in the morning of July 9, 1999, and their numbers gradually increased. The Committee was provided with contradictory reports regarding the actual number of these individuals. Close examination indicates, however, their involvement in reciprocal stone throwing, clashing with the students, and entering the Kuy.

 

3. Close examination further indicates that a number of these individuals arrived on the scene after being informed through a certain means of communication, and that a small number arrived on the scene using other means. The Committee looked into how these individuals were present at the scene but did not arrive at a particular conclusion in the preliminary stages.

For instance, when one of them was questioned at the Committee about how he learned [of what was going on] he stated ‘an unidentified person told me on the phone and I came on the scene based on that same unidentified phone call’. Another one of these individuals also provided an account to the same effect in preliminary investigations regarding his presence.

Furthermore, another individual, whose detailed report will follow below, stated that “obtaining information” while on patrol in the street was how he [learned of the events and] was present at the scene. Therefore, [the Committee] emphasized [the necessity of] further follow ups [and investigation into the matter] by the Ministry of Information and the Police Force Information Department. The Police Force Information Department also stresses the fact that these individuals were present at the scene with prior planning.

4. In spite of the presence of a number of known individuals from well-known unofficial entities, the Committee was not able to conclude that individuals representing these entities participated in the beatings and entered the Kuy with prior planning and decision-making.

5. The Police Force presented the Committee with a list of the names of seven of these individuals who participated in the clashes. The Committee referred the names of the aforementioned individuals to the Ministry of Information Special Deputyship in coordination with the relevant judicial authorities.

Several of these individuals have already been arrested and have admitted to being present at the Kuy and the dormitories, but have denied any participation in beatings and damage [to property]. The Ministry of Information has been tasked with further investigation into the matter so that a final conclusion can be reached.

6. Investigations indicate the presence of certain suspect and adventure-seeking individuals on both sides of this incident. For instance, it became clear to the Committee that there were adventure-seeking and at times unrighteous and wicked elements acting under the cover of [Islamic] holy labels in the Kuy events.

7. Given that the subject of shooting was among the more ambiguous and at the same time more important issues to shed light on the various aspects of the case, the Committee concentrated a portion of its efforts on identifying the operatives and the elements related thereto. Investigations show that in the Kuy events, there were three instances of suspicious shootings.

Nevertheless, no student was killed on the night of the incident. In one instance, at around 4 o’clock in the morning, in the course of entering the Kuy, three shots were fired. In the second instance, Mr. (…), one of the plainclothes forces present at the scene, was shot, and in the third instance on Friday, a police officer was injured and a Revolutionary Guards serviceman with a bachelor’s degree was wounded and died at the hospital.

In the first instance, the Committee examined the videos submitted where the face of a person holding a Colt handgun who fires three shots can be seen.

The Police Force Information Department [representative] appeared before the Committee and the aforementioned footage and a request for follow up was submitted to him.

According to the report received from the Police Force, the picture of the aforementioned individual was extracted from the video and he was ultimately arrested in [a separate] case of armed robbery.

The aforementioned individual is named (…) and was arrested along with three other people. Investigations show that all of them had participated in the events of entering the Kuy.

It is worth noting that the shots fired led to clouding the environment and further instigating the students. The aforementioned individual is currently in police detention awaiting further investigations.

In the second instance, considering that Mr. (…), one of the plainclothes forces present at the scene identified an individual as the shooter, the shooter was arrested after running away for a time.

Initially the shooter denied the deed; it was therefore decided that both the shooter and the person who was shot be arrested by the Ministry of Information Special Deputyship and that necessary investigations be conducted in that regard.

It is worth noting that considering Mr. (…)’s background – who has a record of involvement in altercations with two cabinet ministers and has become famous as someone who has left a well-known group – the matter at hand would certainly have become much more complicated had he been killed.

In the third instance – an incident that occurred on Friday – with the help of the Police Force and through questioning witnesses and making a composite photo [using police methods], they have come close to identifying the shooter. The suspect was once seen in the street but was able to flee.

End of report.

[Photo caption: The Leader of the Revolution Appeasing Students Harmed in the 18 Tir Events]

 

National Security Council Secretariat Bulletins After the Events of 18 Tir

Bulletهn Number 1

Following a National Security Council meeting, the Council’s Secretariat issued a bulletin Saturday night condemning the Kuy-e Daneshgah incident and clashing with the students. The bulletin states:

On the orders of the Honorable President of the Islamic Republic, the National Security High Council Secretariat convened an extraordinary meeting to address the recent events of the Kuy-e Daneshgah, and took into consideration all the various aspects of the unfortunate incident of clashing with students and entering the Kuy-e Daneshgah sanctum, and made some important decisions.

The Ministers of Culture and Higher Education, Health and Medical Treatment, Interior, as well as security officials, presented detailed reports regarding the clashes, damages, and treatment of the students. It was decided that:

1. This unfortunate incident is not acceptable and forgivable in any manner whatsoever; the National Security High Council Secretariat condemns these actions and expresses empathy with the students, the injured, and others harmed by the events.

2. The National Security High Council Secretariat appointed a special group to conduct a comprehensive and thorough examination and a minute and detailed investigation into both the apparent and hidden aspects, causes, and elements of the incident, and the precise identification of and decisive dealing with the pressure groups that are at the root of a great many problems through their illegal actions, and ruled that the official who ordered the entry of the Police Force into the Kuy-e Daneshgah be fired and be dealt with in accordance with the law.

3. The students be compensated for all material and psychological loss and damage incurred, and that [physical and structural] damages be remedied.

4. All detainees have been released and the National Security High Council Secretariat has designated a group to follow up on the situation of those injured in the incident and to make arrangements for their immediate treatment.

5. The National Security High Council Secretariat asks our dear students to maintain their calm and rely on legal means in order to assist the Council in investigating and examining this unfortunate incident.

6. The National Security High Council Secretariat’s conclusions were presented to the Supreme Leader and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and he approved the Secretariat’s rulings and emphasized the necessity of following up on the matter.

 

Bulletin Number 2

The National Security High Council Secretariat issued its Bulletin Number 2 and announced that:

1. In achieving the goals set out in Paragraph 2 of the previous Bulletin regarding conducting a minute and detailed investigation into the apparent and hidden causes and elements of the incident, and decisive dealing with the pressure groups and other illegal actors, the Secretariat has ruled that the Minister of Information is tasked with identifying and taking legal action against these groups of individuals.

In the first actions taken, seven of these individuals have thus far been identified and arrested.

2. Based on investigations [conducted by the Secretariat] and the examination of the discussions held at the Tehran Province Security Council, as well as the statements made by relevant persons in charge, it became clear that Second Brigadier-General Ahmadi and his Deputy were at fault in this incident.

Therefore, they will be removed from office and put at the disposal of competent judicial authorities.

Furthermore, Tehran Police District Commander’s lack of wisdom and prudence [in handling the matter] was also established; he has received a reprimand and has been referred to the Minister of the Interior for further action.

3. All 200 of the detainees were released and there is currently no one in detention.

4. The necessary funds have been put at the disposal of the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education and the Ministry of Hygiene and Medical Treatment so that they can take measures to compensate for the losses and damages incurred.

5. Based on the thorough investigations conducted, the only person who has died in this incident is the late Service Officer Ezzat Ebrahimnejad from [the town of] Pol-e Dokhtar.

The latter spent his days off at the student dormitory with his friends. Complete and thorough examinations indicate that other unofficial rumors and reports have no credence whatsoever.

6. We hope that our dear students and all those who care about our Regime, will support this Secretariat in performing its assigned duties.

Based on information received, the National Security High Council Secretariat declares that unfortunately, a [small] number of people, by chanting unreasonable slogans and turning the students’ wholesome movement into an extremist one, and dragging those opposed to this movement to the scene, intended to thus lay the groundwork for clashes and create an environment for rumors, cynicism, and pessimism in society.

The Secretariat’s findings in following up on the shooting in the middle of the night of Friday, July 9, 1999, is indicative of this completely suspicious act.

In this shooting, committed by firing of three shots from a Colt firearm, a police officer, a student, and a citizen were wounded, and investigations in this regard have been entrusted to the Ministry of Information.

The National Security High Council Secretariat, while expressing utmost respect to all students and every member of the populace, expects them to carry out their gatherings within legal frameworks and by obtaining [the appropriate] permits from the Ministry of the Interior. It goes without saying that the Ministry of the Interior will provide all necessary cooperation in these matters.

 

Bulletin Number 3

In its Bulletin Number 3 issued Sunday night, the National Security High Council Secretariat emphasized the necessity of maintaining calm and security, and thanked those students who, through respect for the law and maintaining calm, had prevented opportunistic elements from taking advantage of the circumstances. The text of the Bulletin reads as follows:

1. Tonight the National Security High Council Secretariat held a meeting in which it examined all the reports submitted by governmental entities in charge, and emphasized the necessity of maintaining calm and security. The Secretariat ordered the existing working groups to follow its directives until their full implementation within the framework of the Leader’s guidance and the President’s directives.

2. The Secretariat thanks those students who, through respect for the law and maintaining calm, have prevented opportunistic elements from taking advantage of the circumstances.

3. The Secretariat emphasizes that assemblies and demonstration marches can take place only upon obtainment of [the appropriate] permits in accordance with the law, [at which point] they will be provided with Police protection. Any gathering without a permit is unlawful and violators will be dealt with in accordance with the law.

4. The National Security High Council Secretariat continues to follow up on the problems related to the recent unfortunate events and will apprise the great people of Iran of the conclusions it reaches in future bulletins.

 

Bulletin Number 4

In its Bulletin Number 4, the National Security High Council Secretariat issued a warning to opportunistic, agitator, and anti-revolutionary elements that are looking to create unrest and to harass the polpulace by taking advantage of the situation.

The full text of the bulletin reads as follows:

In the course of two sessions, the National Security High Council Secretariat examined various reports provided by students, executive entities, the Police Force, and the security forces, and emphasized the following conclusions:

1. The Secretariat expresses its appreciation to the entire population, the students, university professors, the clergy, and Bassijis for their efforts in maintaining calm and security in society, and advises respect for the law, unity of word and action in the nationwide demonstration marches of Wednesday.

2. The Secretariat and the working groups continue to look for the root causes of the Kuy-e Daneshgah events and to examine and analyze the reasons for the occurrence thereof, and expect all entities in charge to strive to accomplish their assigned tasks and duties so that the Secretariat may determine and deal with behind the scenes conspiracies at the root of this incident and the suspicious street movements subsequent thereto.

3. The National Security High Council Secretariat warns opportunist, agitator, and anti-revolutionary elements who are looking to foment unrest and to harm and harass people by taking advantage of the circumstances, that it will not stand for harassment and destruction of the people’s property, and that it has tasked Police and security forces with the duty of identifying and arresting adventure-seeking, wicked, and rioter elements, employing revolutionary zeal and decisiveness, and to put them at the disposal of judicial authorities.

The National Security High Council Secretariat will report Tehran’s security situation as well as the conclusions of its follow ups, to the people, at the appropriate time and as they become available.